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A B S T R A C T
Recent attempts to conduct experiments in climate ‘geoengineering’ have demonstrated the deeply controversial
nature of this ﬁeld of scientiﬁc research. Social scientists have begun to explore public perceptions of geoen-
gineering, and have documented a signiﬁcant degree of concern over the eﬀective governance of research and
experimentation in this area. Yet, public perception on what constitutes a legitimate geoengineering experiment
and how it should be governed remains under-researched. In this article we report on a series of experimental
deliberative workshops with members of the public designed to elicit and explicate diverse understandings of
geoengineering experiments and their governance. In contrast to previous methods of invited public delibera-
tion, which privilege egalitarian-consensual models of discourse and decision-making, we test a novel approach
that places majoritarian, individualistic, and consensual forms of public deliberation on an equal footing. Our
study suggests that the perceived controllability of experimental interventions is central to public views on their
acceptability, but that controllability is itself a complex, multifaceted quality, drawing together a set of het-
erogeneous concerns about the purpose and repercussions of scientiﬁc work. The citizens who participated in our
workshops employed four criteria to adjudicate the acceptability of geoengineering experiments: (1) the degree
of containment; (2) the uncertainty surrounding experimental outcomes; (3) the reversibility of impacts; and (4) the
scientiﬁc purity of the enterprise. We theorize that the public legitimacy of geoengineering experiments depends
on variable, context-speciﬁc combinations of these criteria, and that technical determinations of the proper
‘scale’ or ‘location’ for geoengineering research will be poor predictors of the sorts of public concerns that will be
triggered by further experimentation in this area.
1. Introduction
The possibility of carrying out deliberate large-scale interventions in
the Earth’s climate system has emerged as a controversial addition to
the arsenal of options to moderate anthropogenic climate change. These
‘geoengineering’ or ‘climate engineering’ proposals comprise variants
that seek to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (carbon
geoengineering), or to reﬂect a fraction of sunlight away from the Earth
(solar geoengineering). Scientists and engineers have begun to design
and conduct experiments to test the technical viability of some of these
ideas. Some of these trials rely on familiar technologies (e.g. the pro-
duction and burial of pyrolyzed biomass, or ‘biochar’), unfold in virtual
environments (e.g. through computational modelling), or involve os-
tensibly non-invasive scales of research (e.g. they unfold within a la-
boratory). The few experiments that have tested new or unfamiliar
technologies in the open have, however, attracted a signiﬁcant degree
of public interest and media scrutiny. Notable cases include the
proposed testbed for a stratospheric aerosol delivery mechanism in-
cluded in the UK Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate
Engineering (SPICE) project (Stilgoe, 2015), and the ocean iron ferti-
lisation release carried out by the Haida Salmon Restoration Corpora-
tion in the North Paciﬁc (Tollefson, 2012).
The obvious public interest in the design and conduct of geoengi-
neering experiments has led to calls for broader civil society consulta-
tion on the deﬁnition of acceptable and unacceptable geoengineering
research. The 2010 Asilomar International Conference on Climate
Intervention Technologies, for instance, concluded with a re-
commendation for “public participation and consultation in research
planning and oversight.” Similarly, the recent reports issued by the U.S.
National Academies of Science on the research that ought to underpin
diﬀerent forms of “climate intervention” argued that “open conversa-
tions about the governance of such research, beyond the more general
research governance requirements, could encourage civil society en-
gagement in the process of deciding the appropriateness of any research
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eﬀorts undertaken” (National Research Council 2015: 153; see also
Rayner et al., 2013; Burns and Flegal, 2015). These calls join broader
arguments for “upstream” citizen engagement in the formulation and
assessment of scientiﬁc research agendas (Wilsdon and Willis 2004;
Stilgoe et al., 2014), speciﬁcally in areas characterized by incertitude
and ambiguity (Stirling, 2007), and where social commitments are still
indeterminate or contingent (Wynne, 1992). The current emphasis on
“responsible” forms of scientiﬁc research and innovation equally em-
phasize the need for governance processes that are anticipatory of im-
pacts, reﬂexive of assumptions, inclusive with respect of the multiple
possible framings of the matter at hand, and responsive to changing
societal values and concerns (Stilgoe et al., 2013).
Social scientiﬁc research has begun to explore public perceptions of
geoengineering, and has identiﬁed growing interest in the eﬀective
governance of scientiﬁc research and technical experimentation in this
area. Deliberative workshops undertaken for the SPICE project testbed,
for instance, suggested public support for greater transparency in re-
search funding decisions, open publication of results, and new inter-
national governance and regulatory structures (Pidgeon et al., 2013).
Focus groups on solar geoengineering have stressed the need for public
conﬁdence on at least ﬁve fronts: in climate science as a reliable guide
to policy; in the ability of research to predict side eﬀects; in the ability
of research to demonstrate eﬃcacy; in eﬀective research governance;
and in the capacity of democratic institutions to accommodate solar
geoengineering technologies (Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013; Merk
et al., 2015). Government-sponsored public engagement exercises on
geoengineering proposals have elicited concerns about the controll-
ability, reversibility, and cost-eﬃciency of diﬀerent geoengineering
options (NERC, 2010). Public appraisals of geoengineering proposals
against other options for tackling climate change have led to three
criteria for good governance: greater reﬂexivity in the articulation of
geoengineered futures, the prioritization of broadly “robust” options
and decisions over narrowly “optimal” ones, and the need to sa-
tisfactorily engage concerned publics before declaring geoengineering a
legitimate object of scientiﬁc governance (Bellamy et al., 2016;
Bellamy, 2016).
Despite these advances in the formulation of general principles for
the eﬀective governance of geoengineering, however, there is still little
evidence on public perceptions of what might constitute a legitimate
geoengineering experiment and how it should be governed (Parkhill
and Pidgeon, 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2013). In this article we report the
ﬁndings of a series of experimental deliberative workshops designed to
elicit and explicate diverse understandings of geoengineering experi-
mentation, and of the adequacy of diﬀerent models of research gov-
ernance. In contrast to previous methods of public deliberation, which
have largely privileged egalitarian forms of discourse and consensual
decision-making, we develop here a novel approach that places ma-
joritarian, individualistic, and consensual models of public deliberation
on an equal footing. Our study suggests that the controllability of ex-
perimental interventions is central to public perceptions of their ac-
ceptability, but that controllability is itself a multidimensional con-
struct, encompassing concerns about physical containment, uncertainty
about experimental outcomes, reversibility of impacts and conformity
with ideals of ‘pure’ science. The ability of citizens to mix these four
criteria in diﬀerent combinations points to the limits of governance
regimes that rely on a single parameter to deﬁne controllability, such as
those premised on a purely linear determination of scale (large/small),
or those that assume the overriding importance of physical location
(indoors/outdoors). In light of these ﬁndings, we explore the multi-
faceted, non-linear nature of the “control dilemma” that characterizes
the governance of emerging science and technology (Collingridge,
1982). We conclude by elaborating on the potential and limitations of
our own experimental approach to public deliberation, and suggest
some avenues for further reﬁning our method.
2. Theory and method
To better explore public understandings of geoengineering research
and views on the appropriate mechanisms for its governance, we de-
vised three ideal-typical workshop formats: ‘majoritarian,’ ‘consensual,’
and ‘individualistic’. As the names suggest, each workshop followed a
diﬀerent set of rules for argumentation and decision-making. We
complemented these rules with a diﬀerent style of facilitation and room
layout for each of the groups, in an eﬀort to encourage group dynamics
aligned with the respective constraints placed on the process of delib-
eration. The three workshops were held on the same day in Norwich,
Norfolk (UK), and were facilitated by the three authors.
In the majoritarian workshop, participants were compelled to reach
a decision by majority vote, allowing, in the event of dissent, a single
minority report. We provided the group with a theatre-style room
layout, and enforced each participant’s right to have the ﬂoor when
speaking. The facilitator did not step in to facilitate the resolution of
diﬀerences of opinion, nor did he assist in the formulation of an agreed
group position. In the consensual workshop, participants were com-
pelled to reach a unitary group position. Failing that, they were asked
to represent in their conclusion every viewpoint expressed within the
group. The facilitator ensured that every participant had a chance, and
indeed an obligation, to speak, and guided the exchanges towards the
articulation of a shared group view. The workshop took place in a room
with a circular open space layout. Finally, in the individualistic work-
shop, which took place in a room with a boardroom-style layout, the
facilitator encouraged the maximum articulation of individual view-
points and the confrontation of diﬀering opinions. He allowed in-
dividuals to try to persuade the rest of the group towards a consensus or
majoritarian decision, but did not facilitate the emergence of a unitary
position.
In designing each of these workshop formats, we took inspiration
from the cultural theory of risk developed by Mary Douglas and Aaron
Wildavsky (1982). The theory posits three ideal-typical worldviews, or
‘cultures’, on the basis of a preference for a particular kind of social
organisation: hierarchical, egalitarian and individualistic. It argues that
these biases will structure risk perception, a hypothesis that has been
explored, through survey research, in relation to nuclear power (Peters
and Slovic, 1996), genetically modiﬁed organisms (Finucane, 2002),
nanotechnology (Kahan et al., 2009), and geoengineering (Bellamy and
Hulme, 2011; Kahan et al., 2015).
In our exercise we attempted to translate the categories of cultural
theory into deliberative formats. We modelled the majoritarian work-
shop after the hierarchical cultural type, the consensual workshop after
the egalitarian type, and the individualistic workshop after the in-
dividualistic type. In developing speciﬁc modes of facilitation and de-
cision-making for each of the workshops, we drew on work in social
psychology that explores the conﬁguration of “political atmospheres”
or “social climates” in laboratory-like settings (e.g. Lewin et al., 1939).
This body of work contends that diﬀerent forms of political organisa-
tion can materialize in small groups under experimental conditions
with the help of adequate facilitation techniques and socio-technical
arrangements (cf. Lezaun and Calvillo, 2014).
We recruited participants to each of these workshops based on their
aﬃnity with hierarchism, egalitarianism or individualism, as measured
by a psychometric survey modiﬁed from Dake (1991). This survey
consisted of statements designed to measure degrees of aﬃnity with
each of the three cultures alongside a four-point Likert scale ranging
from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ (see Bellamy and Hulme,
2011). Through this survey we also gathered information on sex, age,
and National Statistics Socio–Economic Classiﬁcations (NS–SEC), the
standard governmental measure of socioeconomic status in the UK, in
order to produce a study population that was broadly representative for
the county of Norfolk, although this was of secondary importance to
recruitment on the basis of cultural predisposition.
The recruitment survey was administered online through Norfolk
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County Council’s ‘Your Voice’ citizen membership scheme as a ‘topic
blind’ workshop on ‘global environmental issues’. Of 163 respondents,
twenty-one participants were recruited. Of those, six were allocated to
the majoritarian workshop; seven were allocated to the consensual
workshop, and eight were allocated to the individualistic workshop (see
Table 1). Selected respondents received an honorarium for their parti-
cipation in the workshops.
Our goal with this diversiﬁcation of group formats was two-fold.
First, we wanted to avoid the reliance of public engagement methods on
a single model of deliberative exchange, namely the egalitarian-con-
sensual model derived from theories of deliberative democracy.
Decisions on geoengineering research (or on any other public issue, for
that matter) are unlikely to be produced only within egalitarian-con-
sensual contexts. By expanding the range of group formats, and speci-
ﬁcally by considering situations in which participants are encouraged
to reach decisions in agonistic contexts, we hoped to generate a richer
set of argumentative strategies and discursive frames relating to
geoengineering (Bellamy and Lezaun, 2017; Chilvers and Kearnes,
2016). Second, the use of three diﬀerent workshop designs allowed us
to explore whether each form of deliberation and decision-making led
to markedly diﬀerent positions on the acceptability and adequate
governance of geoengineering research. This expectation would be in
line with existing literature on the institutional and cultural determi-
nants of risk perception and technological choice (e.g. Rayner and
Cantor, 1987), but here we tested the hypothesis in deliberative situa-
tions, rather than through the use of opinion surveys as has tradition-
ally been the case.
In pursuing this experimental deliberative approach to public per-
ceptions of geoengineering research governance, our method ran into
some unexpected challenges. In particular, the uneven distribution of
technical expertise within each of the groups quickly manifested itself
as a relevant variable in the evolution of the group’s position, as par-
ticipants who displayed a greater level of familiarity with the technical
questions were able to inﬂuence the course of the group’s deliberation.
The distribution of expertise within each of the groups thus became a
factor that neither the formal decision-making rules nor the facilitation
style could fully keep in check. We reﬂect on the limitations of our
approach, and on ways to reﬁne it further, in the ﬁnal discussion.
The exercise comprised three distinct phases. In the ﬁrst phase,
which lasted 30 min, participants from all three workshops gathered in
plenary and were given brief introductory presentations on: (1) the
causes and risks of anthropogenic climate change; (2) generic options
for tackling climate change (mitigation, adaptation and geoengi-
neering); and (3) four speciﬁc geoengineering proposals selected for
their policy relevance and functional diversity. These four geoengi-
neering proposals were: (1) stratospheric aerosol injection; (2) ocean
iron fertilisation; (3) marine cloud brightening; and (4) the industrial
capture of CO2 from ambient air to be stored underground (air capture
and storage). Our introduction situated geoengineering within the
broader context of climate change in order to avoid the narrower
framings that had beset early public engagements with the ﬁeld
(Bellamy et al., 2012; Bellamy and Lezaun 2017). The brevity of our
introduction was partly intended to limit its ability to pre-form views
and opinions on the matters under discussion.
In the second phase, participants convened in their allocated
workshops and were invited to discuss their initial reactions to the four
geoengineering proposals under consideration. Each workshop gath-
ered for 90 min, and followed the speciﬁc set of discursive and decision-
making rules described above. Participants from all three workshops
then reconvened in plenary to receive a further 15-min presentation on
four ideal-typical models for the governance of geoengineering re-
search. The four models were: (1) self–regulation, where research is
overseen by scientists within the parameters of traditional peer-review
(cf. Parson and Keith, 2013); (2) the establishment of a new in-
dependent body with the power to review and approve proposals for
new research on geoengineering (cf. Rayner et al., 2013); (3) the ne-
gotiation of an international agreement harmonizing the conduct of
geoengineering research across countries (cf. Bodle et al., 2014); and
(4) the enactment of an international moratorium banning any further
research (cf. Hulme, 2014). Each of these governance models was de-
ﬁned with suﬃcient ﬂexibility to encourage participants to elaborate its
parameters as appropriate.
In the third phase, participants reassembled in their respective
groups to discuss the four governance options in a further 90-min ses-
sion. Participants were encouraged to discuss one geoengineering pro-
posal at a time, and were told that for each proposal they could adopt
one of the governance models, combine elements of several of them, or
develop an entirely new alternative. Facilitators emphasized that the
discussion pertained to research on geoengineering, and not to the ul-
timate deployment of geoengineering technologies. In addition, facil-
itators sought to elicit views on how diﬀerent governance models might
apply to diﬀerent ‘scales’ of experimentation discussed in the geoengi-
neering literature: computer simulations, laboratory experiments, and
small-, medium- and large-scale outdoor experiments. As we will see,
the distinction between research and deployment was not easily
maintained in the course of the discussions, nor did it map neatly onto
the various ‘scales’ of experimentation. Indeed, the proper character-
ization of an experiment− how best to deﬁne its ‘location’ or ‘scale’−
became a crucial and contested element in the deliberations over al-
ternative governance regimes.
In the course of the discussion, facilitators did not introduce the
question of the potential trade-oﬀs between the risks posed by geoen-
gineering research and those posed by pre-existing anthropogenic cli-
mate change. At the same time, they did not prevent participants from
exploring the question if they so wanted. Although other public en-
gagement exercises have actively investigated this issue, largely by
presenting geoengineering as a possible response in the event of a
‘climate emergency’ (e.g. NERC, 2010), we believed that framing the
deliberations in this manner would have introduced a false dilemma, as
geoengineering is only one among several possible courses of action to
Table 1
Participant proﬁles from the majoritarian (A1–6), consensual (B1–7) and individualistic
(C1–8) workshops.
Code Culture a Sex Age NS–SEC
A1 A F 45 − 64 4 − 9
A2 A F 45 − 64 4 − 9
A3 A F 45 − 64 1 − 3
A4 A B C M 45 − 64 1 − 3
A5 – M 45 − 64 4 − 9
A6 – M 45 − 64 1 − 3
B1 B M 24 − 44 1 − 3
B2 B F 45 − 64 1 − 3
B3 B F 45 − 64 1 − 3
B4 B M 45 − 64 1 − 3
B5 B F 65+ 4 − 9
B6 B A C F 65+ 4 − 9
B7 B M 65+ 4 − 9
C1 C F 18 − 24 4 − 9
C2 C F 45 − 64 4 − 9
C3 C F 45 − 64 1 − 3
C4 C B M 45 − 64 4 − 9
C5 C F 65+ 4 − 9
C6 C M 65+ 1 − 3
C7 C M 65+ 1 − 3
C8 C M 65+ 1 − 3
a ‘Culture’ refers here to an aﬃnity for ideal-typical ways of organising social relations,
as deﬁned by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). Acronyms: majoritarian (A), consensual (B),
individualistic (C). Where participants showed an aﬃnity for more than one ideal-typical
form of organisation, predispositions were ordered by strength of association. Where
participants showed no aﬃnity for any ideal-typical form of organisation, none are
shown. Across the 163 survey respondents, Cronbach’s alpha coeﬃcients showed reliable
internal consistencies for the consensual (α= 0.67) and individualistic (α= 0.71) scales,
but not for the majoritarian (α= 0.27) scale.
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reduce the threat posed by climate change. We have researched public
perceptions of geoengineering risks and beneﬁts in comparison to those
of mitigation and adaptation elsewhere (Bellamy et al., 2016).
All workshops were audio recorded, fully transcribed, and subject to
qualitative coding analysis by two of the authors for inter-coder relia-
bility using the framework developed by Krueger (1994). This coding
sought to identify recurrent themes and discursive frames used by
participants in their reasoning about geoengineering research and its
governance. It served to map the key structures of argumentation that
emerged in the workshops, rather than to produce a quantitative or




The discussion in the majoritarian workshop focussed on the lim-
itations of self-governance by scientists as a method to regulate
geoengineering research. The most assertive member of the group
framed the discussion from the outset by arguing that:
“You’ve got [to have] somebody coming in from the outside with a
fresh pair of eyes to see whether what [scientists] are doing is ac-
tually appropriate” (A2).
Concern that scientists might ‘create Frankenstein’s monster’ led
participants to recall a range of ostensibly analogous regulatory de-
bacles in the UK and beyond that showed the limitations of self-gov-
ernance by experts or professionals. Examples mentioned in the dis-
cussion extended well beyond science and technology. They included,
for instance, racism amongst police oﬃcers requiring the establishment
of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, illegal practices
amongst the press leading to the Leveson Inquiry, and patient harm
caused by novel pharmaceuticals resulting in government agencies
imposing tougher drug approval procedures. All of these were cited as
demonstrations of the need for external scrutiny and oversight of pro-
fessional communities. The so-called ‘Climategate’ aﬀair was also in-
voked to support this idea, with the argument that “whether it’s true or
not I do think that there needs to be somebody independent overseeing
that” (A2).
When put to the vote, a clear majority position emerged on the most
appropriate model for the governance of geoengineering research. This
view did not think it necessary to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent
geoengineering methods, but emphasized the need to discriminate be-
tween diﬀerent levels or phases of research. As A2 put it:
“I don’t think the rules should be any diﬀerent irrespective of what
the research is… Should we not just have rules for research: if you
want to do research this is what you need to do? I think you’re
blurring the boundaries then [if you treat diﬀerent geoengineering
proposals diﬀerently], because scientists will be going, ‘Ah yes, but
mine doesn’t ﬁt into that, it ﬁts into this. And therefore I should be
allowed to do this; whereas you’re doing this and you shouldn’t be
allowed to do that”'.
Although several participants noted the diﬃculty in neatly separ-
ating diﬀerent levels or phases of research, the key threshold was
identiﬁed at the point when research is conducted outside the labora-
tory. This was the moment when researchers were thought to be
“stepping over the line” (A5).
A majority of participants expressed a preference for governing in-
doors geoengineering research, including computer modelling, through
a new independent body. Because all the forms of experimentation
under discussion were seen to carry international implications, be those
collective action challenges in the case of air capture and storage, or
transboundary risks and impacts in the case of the three other propo-
sals, any outdoors research was thought to require some sort of prior
international agreement, although the details of such an agreement
were not speciﬁed (A1, A2, A5, A6). A majority of participants were
careful, however, to explain that this view did not imply an endorse-
ment of a research moratorium per se: “I’m not about risk avoidance,
I’m about risk management” (A2).
A minority of members of the majoritarian group appeared less
concerned about issues of external review and at the same time oﬀered
more nuanced views on individual geoengineering methods. Warning
against the risk of stiﬂing scientiﬁc creativity, these participants also
argued that the distinction between indoors and outdoors research was
not always the most relevant consideration. In some cases, for instance,
research could be conducted outdoors at such small scales as to merit no
additional independent oversight:
“A machine sucking out a few kilograms of CO2 out of the atmo-
sphere [is] not going to keep me awake at night really”… “I’m pretty
relaxed about [ocean iron fertilisation] in the light of the chemicals
that get pumped into the sea every day”… “I’d be pretty relaxed
about sticking some salt into the air really, quite frankly”…
“Sulphate particles: I feel less relaxed about this one than any of the
others. Perhaps because it’s sulphate it sounds like a chemical
sounding word. If you think of it as volcanic ash it doesn’t sound
quite as horrendous. But, as I keep reminding myself, we’re only
talking about research”. (A4)
Accordingly, the minority report expressed a preference for gov-
erning all geoengineering research through self-regulatory measures up
to a certain phase in the research and development process (A3, A4). In
contrast to the majority position, however, this minority thought that
the threshold for external, independent oversight should be deﬁned
diﬀerently for diﬀerent geoengineering options. In the case of air cap-
ture and storage and marine cloud brightening, for example, self-reg-
ulation was thought appropriate for all levels of phases of research, but
an international agreement was deemed necessary prior to deployment.
For ocean iron fertilisation, self-regulation was seen as appropriate for
research in ‘controlled zones,’ but an international agreement was
thought necessary for research in ‘open zones’. In the case of strato-
spheric aerosol injection, the governance of ‘indoors’ research could be
left to the scientists themselves, but any ‘outdoor’ experiment was
thought to require an international agreement, and a moratorium
should be placed on any outdoor experiments exceeding a ‘medium’
scale.
3.2. Consensual workshop
Most of the discussion in the consensual workshop centred on the
role of an independent review mechanism and its relation to the ben-
eﬁts and shortcomings of allowing scientists to regulate themselves. The
discussion was initially framed by B4, a retired government scientist,
who placed geoengineering research ﬁrmly within the framework of
other scientiﬁc activities that are routinely funded, and thus overseen
by, government or research funding organisations. Given its lack of
commercial application, he argued, geoengineering research was likely
to be funded by public institutions, and these would naturally introduce
a form of independent review in the process of selecting and approving
research projects:
“If you’ve got to apply for money you immediately subject yourself
to independent review. That’s why I say that [self-regulation] is
actually a non-starter here”. (B4)
As a contrast to this world of regulated science, B4 introduced the
ﬁgure of the ‘maverick’ to describe individuals “who decide that
nothing’s going to control them; that they want to do something in-
dependently.” In the opinion of B4, the maverick was someone who
challenged “the wisdom of the community,” was able to operate
without external support, and was thus prone to introduce unacceptable
risks.
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The question of how independent review and self-governance by
scientists might relate to one another was introduced multiple times by
the facilitator, but failed to gain traction as a topic of discussion. The
issue was addressed, however, later on, when the speciﬁc question of
who should be involved in the independent review of geoengineering
research proposals was posed. B4 introduced here a distinction between
‘pure’ (or ‘blue skies’) and ‘applied’ research, in the context of a dis-
cussion about whether, and when, a bioethicist should be involved in
the evaluation of stratospheric aerosol injection:
“You don’t need to ask bioethicists as to whether the shape of a
sulphate particle is going to reﬂect light, it’s not relevant. But if I
was then to say: ‘well, I have developed this particle which is the
perfect shape for reﬂecting light, I now want to inject it into the
atmosphere.’ The impact of that and the scope of that is so huge that
the breadth of reviewers you have to go to must also be equally
huge, because then you’re talking about climatologists, you’re
talking about chemists as well, physicists as well, but you’re also
talking about people who understand the stratosphere, you’re
talking about almost everybody.” (B4)
Several other members of the group found the distinction between
‘pure’ and ‘applied’ research useful, and they returned to it repeatedly
in the course of the workshop to make sense of other aspects of
geoengineering research governance. As the above quote indicates,
another critical distinction was provided by the location of experi-
mentation. For many in the group the conduct of research outside the
laboratory represented the most signiﬁcant threshold as far as the ap-
propriate form of governance was concerned. Views in favour of an
international agreement, for instance, multiplied when the possibility of
operating outside contained scientiﬁc facilities was discussed. The only
exception to this rule was air capture and storage, which was thought to
require national-level regulation at most, regardless of the location or
scale of the experiment. In the case of stratospheric aerosol injection,
several participants noted that for a release to constitute a meaningful
experiment it would have to involve large quantities of chemicals:
“Some of those things like the last one, sulphur particles, how would
you…? You’d have to do it on a large scale to be able to have an
eﬀect because as soon as you put those particles up they’d just
disperse into such thin concentrations that there’d be no way of
monitoring their eﬀectiveness. So that would have to have a wider
agreement I guess, if you were actually going to be serious about
putting it into the large-scale research. So the more ambitious the
project and the harder it is to conﬁne, the more general consensus
you have to have”. (B7)
In other words, some participants perceived a proportional relation
between the scientiﬁc value of an experiment and the degree of con-
sensus it would require, at least in the case of the release of sulphate
particles into the stratosphere. Furthermore, the above quote also
suggests that the distinction between ‘research’ and ‘deployment’ was
not always central to the group’s understanding of the governance
challenges at hand. When the discussion shifted to the need for inter-
national agreements, speciﬁcally in relation to stratospheric aerosol
injection and ocean fertilisation, it was often diﬃcult for participants to
parse whether such an agreement would cover only research or should
also be extended to deployment. The view expressed by a majority of
participants seemed to be that, given the implicit transboundary im-
pacts associated with these options, any intervention in the open en-
vironment ought to be preceded by a clear set of international rules,
regardless of whether this intervention was categorized as ‘research’ or
‘deployment.’ Questions about who could or should be in a position to
lay down such rules led to a discussion about the role of the UN and
associated bodies. Examples of comparable legal instruments were of-
fered, for instance international agreements banning intervention in the
Arctic, whaling, or the exploitation of the moon. Yet it was generally
felt that a similar initiative for geoengineering was unlikely to succeed
given the current state of international institutions and the degree of
geopolitical rivalry among major powers.
For all participants, however, support for an international agree-
ment did not imply support for a ban or a moratorium on geoengi-
neering research. In fact, asked by the facilitator if they could think of
any area of scientiﬁc inquiry, apart from geoengineering, for which an
immediate ban on research would be justiﬁed, participants were unable
to identify any. It was generally felt that a robust independent review
mechanism involving relevant scientiﬁc experts (including, in some
cases, bioethicists) would be suﬃcient to exclude any form of research
deemed socially or ethically unacceptable. Bans or moratoria on re-
search were thought to be incompatible with scientiﬁc progress− itself
a pre-condition for the eﬀective governance of new technologies:
“I don’t think you could ever say you could make bans; you can
make judgments. Otherwise you don’t make progress; you wouldn’t
have the inoculations; you wouldn’t have the antibiotics; you
wouldn’t have anything, would you? So banning things, controlling
things, it’s diﬀerent.” (B5)
3.3. Individualistic workshop
Many participants in the individualistic workshop initially sought to
impose a straightforward, binary approach to the governance of
geoengineering research. This binary approach diﬀerentiated between
solar proposals (stratospheric aerosol injection and marine cloud
brightening), which were viewed as more diﬃcult to control and
therefore requiring more stringent regulation, and carbon proposals
(ocean iron fertilisation and air capture and storage), which were seen
as less problematic and therefore more amenable to self-regulation by
researchers. A minority of participants, however, strongly advocated a
more nuanced view, emphasising questions of uncertainty and irre-
versibility across the four geoengineering options under discussion. C7,
for instance, was persistent and often persuasive in asking others in the
group to take a more sensitive approach to the degree of ignorance
about the potential impacts of ocean iron fertilisation, and to be more
critical of the reliability of any knowledge derived from small-scale
experiments:
“I think the marine environment is just so fragile that anything other
than the marine environment isn’t going to give you the information
that you need. I think that’s the problem”. (C7)
Indeed, in the course of the discussion some participants came to
articulate sophisticated ideas about uncertainty. C6, for instance, re-
marked on several occasions in relation to stratospheric aerosol injec-
tion that there was a ‘chicken and egg’ conundrum at play in the tension
between reducing uncertainty through medium- or large-scale testing,
on the one hand, and minimising the risk of potentially unknown im-
pacts, on the other. For C5, this conundrum plagued any eﬀort to sci-
entiﬁcally establish the eﬃcacy of marine cloud brightening via small-
scale experiments:
“How the blazes do you know if you’re picking up cloud brightening
in a small area [that it] is actually reducing the sun’s eﬀect on the
earth? Wouldn’t you have to do it on a global basis right from the
word go?”
When the facilitator probed the possibility of ‘rogue’ experiments
with ocean iron fertilisation, this provoked further introspection from
some participants about the possibility of a ‘slippery slope’ between
research and deployment, as in the following remark:
“If we’re not careful the next thing is they’ll have a medium [ex-
periment]; or they might skip that and go straight into a big ex-
periment. Especially with the ship one [ocean iron fertilisation]
there might be one setting sail from Felixstowe this afternoon.” (C6)
More generally, participants invoked multiple analogies to think
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through the potential implications of allowing researchers to govern
their own work without external review: “It’s a bit like the press thing:
could they be trusted to keep within their remit, I suppose” (C3). Many
participants asserted that diﬀerent governance mechanisms should be
used to govern ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ research. As participant C6 put it:
“You must let people do computer modelling and laboratory experi-
ments”. Others similarly expressed concerns about stiﬂing potentially
valuable scientiﬁc progress through unnecessary regulation of ‘purer’
forms of research: “If you take pure research, I don’t believe in too
much regulation, [because] I think it inhibits what you’re doing” (C8).
Despite their concerns about the governance challenges involved, par-
ticipants were in agreement that research into geoengineering should
not be outlawed altogether.
In light of concerns about a ‘slippery slope’ between research and
deployment, the majority of participants were unwilling to endorse
medium- and large-scale geoengineering experiments before an inter-
national agreement setting out clear guidelines for the conduct of such
research could be put in place. Only a minority of participants rejected
this idea, preferring instead an independent review panel, on the
ground that any international agreement would struggle to eﬀectively
regulate the wide diversity of geoengineering experiments being en-
visaged:
“Personally I would probably go more for the independent review
body because every case is diﬀerent and you can’t legislate for every
single thing that might happen. That’s the trouble. You are going to
have to have pretty elastic boundaries if you’re going to have an
agreement.” (C2)
Regardless of participants’ views on the feasibility of designing an
eﬀective international framework, all participants agreed that this ap-
proach should apply to every one of the four geoengineering proposals
discussed with the exception of air capture and storage, which − os-
tensibly due to its similarity to carbon capture and storage (CCS)
technology− was deemed to carry less uncertainty and fewer risks and
thus not require an international governance regime.
Whilst computer-based, indoor, and small-scale forms of outdoor
experimental research were viewed as suﬃciently benign for partici-
pants to place their trust in scientiﬁc self-regulation, many participants
nonetheless argued for greater transparency in the conduct of research
‘at all levels’. For instance, all participants expressed surprise, and in
some cases irritation, when they learned that technologies such as
ocean fertilisation had already been tested, and most felt it was un-
acceptable that they hadn’t at least heard about these activities before.
For some, their lack of awareness of recent geoengineering experiments
fuelled additional concerns about the real motives and objectives of this
activity. This was a particularly prominent sentiment where potential
commercial involvement in research ventures was mooted, both in
terms of who would fund the research itself, and who would beneﬁt
from any subsequent development of speciﬁc technologies:
“When you're talking about environmental studies and so on, if
they’re sponsored by some kind of Christian or religious organisa-
tion you might say ‘well that’s jolly good’. But if it’s Tata Motors or
Ferguson Tractors you know, I’m a bit worried about it.” (C8)
4. Discussion
In line with the purpose of our original design, the three workshops
elicited a wide range of opinions on the governance of geoengineering
research. In fact, one of the most striking aspects of the exercise was the
ability of participants to articulate diverse and fairly complex positions
on the acceptability of diﬀerent forms of geoengineering and on the
beneﬁts and challenges of the proposed governance models. This is
particularly remarkable given the limited duration of the workshops
and the cursory introduction to the topic participants had received
before the discussions started. This experience is consistent with many
other consultation exercises on geoengineering (e.g. Corner et al., 2013;
Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013; Bellamy et al., 2016; Wibeck et al.,
2015), and suggests that lay citizens are more than capable of engaging
with the issues under consideration in signiﬁcant depth, regardless of
their prior level of knowledge or awareness of geoengineering.
Although we did not intend to quantify levels of support for each of
the four research governance models, it is apparent that most partici-
pants preferred intermediary regulatory measures that built on and
expanded the mechanisms of peer- and independent-review that char-
acterize the governance of scientiﬁc research in other areas. A desire
not to stiﬂe scientiﬁc progress, combined with latent scepticism about
the capacity of institutions, particularly international ones, to produce
eﬀective regulations, restricted support for any form of global mor-
atorium across all three groups (cf. Parker, 2014). At the same time,
there was little support for self-regulation if this simply meant em-
powering scientists to conduct whatever research they wanted. Even
those who were happy to endorse self-regulation assumed that scientiﬁc
research is regularly and as a matter of course subjected to rigorous
scrutiny, and that the same level of oversight should apply to geoen-
gineering. The ﬁgure of the ‘maverick’ or ‘rogue’ experimenter served to
highlight the default view of science as a well-governed domain con-
strained by institutional and communitarian rules.
As outlined in Fig. 1, each of the three workshops yielded a distinct
set of preferences for the governance of geoengineering research. The
majoritarian workshop formed two perspectives: a majority (four par-
ticipants) expressed a preference for an independent review process in
the case of indoor research, and an international agreement for any
research unfolding outdoors. This approach should apply, in the view of
this majority, across the four geoengineering proposals under con-
sideration. The minority group, on the other hand, adopted a more
nuanced and technology speciﬁc view (see Figure for details). The
consensual workshop expressed a preference for self-regulation in the
case of computational modelling, independent review for other indoor
research, and an international agreement for outdoor research. These
criteria applied to the four geoengineering proposals with the exception
of air capture and storage, for which the workshop expressed a pre-
ference for governing outdoor research through national legislation.
Finally, the individualistic workshop expressed a preference for self-
regulation in the case of computational modelling, other indoor re-
search, and small-scale outdoor research, and for an international
agreement in the case of medium- and large-scale outdoor research.
These criteria were applied to all of the geoengineering options under
discussion except air capture and storage, where it was deemed that
independent review, and not an international agreement, would be a
more appropriate governance mechanism for medium- and large-scale
outdoor research.
Since only one example of each ideal-typical workshop was staged
in this study, it is diﬃcult to judge with any degree of conﬁdence the
extent to which the outcome of the deliberations was linked to speciﬁc
elements of workshop design. Some of the hypotheses that are com-
monly derived from the cultural theory of risk did not match the po-
sitions taken by the groups. For instance, cultural theory would suggest
that a consensual group, inspired by the tenets of egalitarianism, would
tend to express a preference for stricter regulatory approaches (e.g. an
international moratorium) (Rayner, 1991). Yet, participants in our
consensual workshop generally favoured ‘softer’ approaches to the
governance of research, such as self-regulation by scientists, particu-
larly in the case of indoors research. On the other hand, the in-
dividualistic workshop, modelled after the individualist bias described
in cultural theory, would in principle be expected to favour softer
regulatory approaches. In practice, however, this group yielded a
clearer polarization of views depending on the nature of the research
under consideration, with softer approaches advocated for indoors and
small-scale outdoors research, and harder approaches preferred for
medium- and large-scale outdoors research. Further investigations of
the relationship between group format and deliberative outcome would
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require a reﬁnement of the method used in this investigation, including
possibly the introduction of control groups. Yet any experimentaliza-
tion of cultural theory (or any other social theory for that matter) will
have to contend with the emergent properties of groups created for
research purposes. This point became salient in our investigation, for
instance in the inﬂuence exerted by individuals with a professional
scientiﬁc background (such as the retired government scientist in the
consensual group) over the direction and substance of the discussions.
We will return to the question of emergent group properties when we
discuss opportunities for reﬁning this experimental deliberative ap-
proach.
An especially relevant dimension in the dynamics of collective dis-
course was the choice of analogies used to make sense of the govern-
ance dilemmas attendant to geoengineering research. Participants in
the three workshops often deployed forms of experiential expertise that
went far beyond geoengineering. Some of these analogies concerned
other controversial ‘emerging technologies’, but many, like the refer-
ences to the external oversight of the press, for instance, or to existing
international treaties for the protection of natural resources or nuclear
weapons, connected geoengineering research and its governance to
broader questions of professional authority, institutional capacity, and
political legitimacy. It is important to understand such analogies as
more than means of sense-making and opinion forming (cf. Wibeck
et al., 2015). In the context of a deliberative exchange they are rheto-
rical devices strategically deployed to advance purposeful discursive
objectives (Schwarz-Plaschg, 2016). References to highly contentious
issues such as unethical behaviour by journalists, racism amongst police
oﬃcers, or deaths resulting from pharmaceutical testing, were used to
alert interlocutors to the historical trajectories of more familiar social
problems, and to shift the discussion away from matters of strictly
‘technical’ competence vis-à-vis geoengineering. Furthermore, the
widespread use of analogies enabled participants to resist and reshape
the framings oﬀered to them by the facilitators, often making a forceful
if implicit argument against reducing the object of deliberation to a
matter of scientiﬁc research governance.
The diversity of arguments and preferences that emerged in our
three workshops also points to the conceptual ambiguity that char-
acterizes dimensions of scientiﬁc research, experimentation and gov-
ernance that are often taken for granted or seen as self-evident. One
important area of conceptual ambiguity concerns the question of
‘location’ or ‘scale’ in geoengineering experimentation. Considerations
about whether an experiment would unfold ‘indoors’ or ‘outdoors’, for
instance, or whether its size or scope constituted a ‘large’ or a ‘small’
intervention, frequently structured participants’ views on the most ap-
propriate governance mechanism- indeed, on the very acceptability of
the research in question. Yet in the full articulation of these arguments
it became apparent that common descriptors of location or scale were
ﬂuid categories. Their meaning was qualiﬁed and modulated by re-
ference to additional elements, and as a result was not reducible to any
self-evident physical deﬁnition (cf. Massey, 1992). For instance, a
‘small’ experiment unfolding ‘indoors’ or in a contained space might be
deemed unacceptable if it was thought to respond to the designs of a
‘maverick’ who was operating outside the controls of the scientiﬁc
community. Or it could be considered too risky if it was deemed to
eventually require, for the full satisfaction of its scientiﬁc validity, an
irreversible intervention in the open environment, as some of the dis-
cussions on marine cloud brightening suggested. On the other hand, a
‘large’ experiment in air capture and storage conducted ‘outdoors’ was
generally thought to present fewer governance challenges than smaller
versions of the three other options, largely, it seems, because it was
thought not to imply an irreversible intervention into the environment.
Scale and location, in other words, often seemed to function as
proxies for a more capacious construct, namely the degree of controll-
ability attributed to any given geoengineering experiment. This was
indeed the crucial quality participants sought to characterize when they
confronted speciﬁc research scenarios. Based on how it was articulated
across the three workshops, controllability represented a complex,
multifaceted quality. Participants drew on at least four dimensions of
concern to deﬁne it: (1) level of containment; (2) uncertainty of ex-
perimental outcomes; (3) reversibility of environmental impacts; and
(4) scientiﬁc purity.
Level of containment refers to those arguments that hinged on the
degree of physical encapsulation of the experiment. This dimension was
often framed in binary terms on the basis of whether the experiment in
question would unfold ‘indoors’ or ‘outdoors’ (i.e. inside or outside a
laboratory facility). Uncertainty of outcomes and impacts includes the
multiple references that can be found in the discussions to the ability to
predict or anticipate the results (and possible harms) of an experimental
intervention. Reversibility of environmental impacts encompasses those
























































































































































































aerosol injection I O I O > M I O < >
Ocean iron 
fertilisation I O C U M I O < >
Marine cloud 
brightening I O R D M I O < >
Air capture and 
storage I O R D M I N < >   
Fig. 1. A comparison of majoritarian, consensual and
individualistic workshop preferences for governing
geoengineering research. Key: Indoor research (I);
Outdoor research (O); Contained research (C);
Uncontained research (U); Any research (R);
Deployment (D); Computational modelling (M);
National regulation for outdoor research (N); Any
research below a medium scale (<); Any research
equal to or above a medium scale (>).
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permanent modiﬁcation of the environment. Finally, under the rubric
of scientiﬁc purity we classify those arguments that emphasized whe-
ther an experiment departed from the ideal of ‘pure’ or ‘basic’ research.
Impure science, in this understanding, included here research con-
ducted or sponsored by ‘mavericks,’ but also research carried out with a
direct commercial intent. In fact, the question of ‘intent’ in geoengi-
neering research arose consistently in relation to conceptions of scien-
tiﬁc purity.
Under certain conditions these four dimensions can be aligned. An
experiment conducted ‘in silico’ or in a contained setting, with rela-
tively predictable outcomes and reversible environmental impacts, and
thought to be carried out in the interests of ‘basic’ science, would in
principle be deemed highly controllable and thus comparatively ac-
ceptable. In contrast, an ‘in vivo’ experiment unfolding in an un-
contained setting, with relatively more unpredictable outcomes and
potentially irreversible impacts, and conducted in the interests of ‘ap-
plied’ science or with commercial intent, would be considered least
controllable and acceptable. Yet more often than not participants had to
grapple with manifold inter-relations between these four dimensions of
controllability, leading to ambivalent, highly qualiﬁed assessments of
the acceptability of certain forms of research.
This ﬁnding resonates with other recent social-scientiﬁc work on
geoengineering experimentation and its public legitimacy. In a series of
focus groups with Japanese citizens, for instance, Asayama et al. (2017)
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant degree of ambiguity and ambivalence with regards to
the possibility of conducting ﬁeld trials of stratospheric aerosol injec-
tion. Participants in this exercise characterized ‘controllability’ by re-
ference to at least three distinct criteria: technical reversibility, in-
stitutional controllability, and spatial boundedness. The fact that
citizens employ complex, multidimensional criteria in evaluating ex-
perimental proposals means that we need more clarity in the deﬁnition
of what is entailed by ‘geoengineering research’ (Asayama et al., 2017).
This need for accountability extends to geoengineering research con-
ducted indoors, even when it is limited to the design and conduct of
computer simulations. As Thilo Wiertz (2015) has noted with respect to
the use of simulations in the development of solar geoengineering op-
tions, computer models often represent “the primary space” in which
social visions of a geoengineered future are articulated and tested, and
as such require an appropriate level of public scrutiny (see also Ed-
wards, 2011).
5. Conclusions
The ability of lay citizens to productively deliberate on the di-
lemmas posed by geoengineering has been demonstrated by a multitude
of consultation exercises conducted over the last decade. Our exercise
validated this conclusion: despite very little (if any) prior knowledge of
the matter at hand and with the help of a cursory introduction to the
topic, a vast majority of participants across the three groups engaged
actively and intelligently with multiple geoengineering research and
governance proposals, putting forward arguments that balanced mul-
tiple criteria of relevance.
Our experimental approach created a diverse set of deliberative
conditions and decision-making processes in order to expand the range
of contexts where actors discuss geoengineering, beyond the traditional
model of egalitarian-consensual deliberation that has traditionally
dominated managed forms of public engagement with emerging tech-
nologies. Notwithstanding the limitations noted earlier, we believe our
design allowed the articulation of a greater variety of viewpoints and
lines of argumentation − for, against, and often critically ambivalent
about speciﬁc geoengineering proposals. Investigating how the parti-
cular conditions of debate and decision-making might impact the sub-
stance of deliberation on geoengineering will require further develop-
ments of the method. This can include the use of control groups, but
also the reﬁnement of facilitation techniques. In devising styles of fa-
cilitation for the majoritarian and individualist groups, for instance, we
encountered a paucity of relevant sources, due to the preponderance of
egalitarian-consensual forms of deliberation in the ﬁelds of science
communication and public engagement with science. Yet any attempts
to improve the method along these lines will have to take into account
the emergent properties of groups created for research purposes. As
several scholars have noted, and as we experienced in our investigation,
publics created explicitly for the purpose of deliberating display forms
of sociability that exceed the formalizations implicit in any particular
design; they express an ‘eventfulness’ proper to the moment of delib-
eration that precludes the ability to fully characterize à priori the
variables in play (cf. Michael 2012; Chilvers and Kearnes 2016; Lezaun
et al., 2016; Pritchard and Gabrys 2016).
Our experimental deliberative exercise yielded a series of relevant
observations. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant one is that the perceived
controllability of a geoengineering experiment is central to its public
acceptability, but that controllability itself is a multidimensional con-
struct. Participants introduced four key dimensions to characterize the
degree of controllability of geoengineering research: (1) experimental
containment; (2) outcome uncertainty; (3) environmental reversibility;
and (4) scientiﬁc purity. While controllability has been noted as a
crucial nexus of public concern regarding controversial technologies,
and indeed a ‘control dilemma’ might be said to deﬁne the trajectory of
all emerging technologies (Collingridge, 1982), what is clear from our
research is that controllability is itself a composite construct and a
multifaceted evaluative register. In other words, citizens draw on
highly speciﬁc technical, institutional, moral and even epistemological
criteria to decide whether a particular innovation trajectory is more or
less controllable, and the manner in which they will combine those
criteria is speciﬁc to the question at hand and as a result diﬃcult to
predict in advance.
For this reason, it would be naïve to reduce the governance of
geoengineering research to any single parameter of the research in
question. Thus, positions that argue that researchers can ‘start small’
even before the governance challenges are fully worked out (see, for
example, Parson and Keith (2013) and Long et al. (2015)), or that ‘in-
door’ experiments can proceed with little need for transparency or
public accountability, overlook the complex discursive processes by
which the parameters of controllability come to be deﬁned (cf. Dilling
and Hauser, 2013; Dilling and Hauser, 2013; Stilgoe, 2013). ‘Control’
emerged in our deliberations as a function not simply of the physical
location and spatial scope of the proposed intervention, but also of the
uncertainty associated with research outcomes, the reversibility of ex-
perimental eﬀects, or the intentionality attributed to the actors in-
volved in the research endeavour.
In sum, our exercise disclosed the variety of criteria citizens employ
in evaluating the acceptability of geoengineering research, and the in-
tricate nature of the arguments they develop for or against experi-
mental interventions in this area. This fact raises the stakes for the
development of appropriate mechanisms for the social appraisal of
geoengineering research, but also opens the ﬁeld in terms of the factors
that can be brought to bear in such an appraisal.
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